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COMMENT: THERMAL IMAGING AND THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT: THE ROLE OF THE KATZ TEST IN THE
AFTERMATH OF KYLLO V. UNITED STATES
“Wherever he may be, asleep or awake, working or resting, in his
bath or in bed, he can be inspected without warning and without
knowing that he is being inspected.”1
I. INTRODUCTION
Ever since the War on Drugs was first declared in the early 1970’s,2
the technologies used by the government to fight it have developed at
an alarming rate.3  Although these technological advancements have
successfully suppressed the amount of drugs within the country, their
use is seriously infringing on American citizens’ right to privacy.4  For
example, law enforcement is utilizing “Carnivore,” a computer pro-
gram that scans the contents of e-mail, and “Millivision,” a device that
can detect guns through people’s clothing by measuring electromag-
netic radiation and producing an image of the body of the person be-
ing viewed.5  As new advancements in technology are developed,
several questions are raised.  Are there any limits that can be placed on
the power of technology so it will not shrink the realm of guaranteed
privacy?  Will the Supreme Court protect the individual’s interest in
being free from unreasonable searches by the government over the
government’s interest in ending the drug trade?
In Kyllo v. United States6 (hereinafter “Kyllo”), the Supreme Court
answered “Yes” to both questions.7  The case involved the highly con-
troversial police procedure of thermal imaging.8  Throughout the
1. GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 173-74 (Signet Classic 1983) (1949).
2. Richard Nixon was the first President to officially announce a war on drugs.
See James M. Naughton, President Gives Highest Priority to Drug Problem, N.Y. TIMES, June 2,
1971, at A1.
3. See, e.g., John Larrabee, Surveillance Zooming in with High-Tech but Critics Fear for
Privacy, USA TODAY, Dec. 26, 1995, at A3.
4. See id.
5. See Millivision Home Page at http://www.millivision.com; How Far Will Com-
puter Monitoring Go?, N.Y. LAW JOURNAL, Dec. 28, 2001 at 1.
6. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
7. See id.
8. See id. at 29.
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1990’s, thermal imaging was one of the most widely used technological
tools utilized by governmental agencies to identify and eliminate the
indoor cultivation of marijuana.9  This was due to the hydroponic
farming techniques required to grow viable marijuana plants in-
doors.10  In particular, the cultivation process requires the extensive
use of artificial lighting.11  These lights generate enormous amounts of
heat that is emanated outdoors either naturally or through a ventila-
tion system installed by the cultivator.12  A thermal imager, placed
outside the residence, can be used to measure and record the magni-
tude of these heat emissions.13  This data generally provided the prob-
able cause necessary for law enforcement to obtain the search warrant
needed to discover and eradicate the indoor growing operations.14
In Kyllo, the Supreme Court held that the use of a thermal imager
to detect heat emissions from a home is a “search” under the Fourth
Amendment and is therefore presumptively unreasonable without a
warrant.15  Although civil libertarians and privacy rights activists ap-
plauded the result,16 upon closer inspection, the case raises some in-
teresting questions.
What determines a “search” under the Fourth Amendment was
established in Katz v. United States.17  Known as the “reasonable expec-
tation of privacy” test, the Court has developed a wide range of case law
applying and discussing the test.18  In Kyllo, the Court cited Katz as
9. See Daniel J. Polatsek, Thermal Imaging and the Fourth Amendment: Pushing the
Katz Test Towards Terminal Velocity, 13 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 453, 453
(1995).
10. See Nation Narcotics Intelligence Consumer Comm. Report, the NNICC RE-
PORT 66 (1996).
11. See id.
12. See Bradley J. Plaschke, United States v. Deaner: Thermal Imagery, the Latest Assault
on the Fourth Amendment Right to Privacy, 12 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO L. 607, 608
n.5 (1994) (citing a telephone interview with Col. Carlos Aniglioh, President, Thermal
Technologies, Inc. (Feb. 12, 1993)).
13. See Mindy G. Wilson, The Prewarrant Use of Thermal Imagery: Has This Technologi-
cal Advance in the War Against Drugs Come at the Expense of Fourth Amendment Protections
Against Unreasonable Searches?, 83 KY. L.J. 891, 893 (1994-95).
14. See id.
15. See Kyllo, 533 at 40.
16. See Adam Miller, Not Quite Up in Smoke Florida Cops Will be Slowed, Not Stymied, by
Ruling that Bans Using Heat Sensors to Detect Pot Crops, BROWARD DAILY BUSINESS REVIEW,
June 20, 2001 at A1.
17. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
18. See e.g., California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988); Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S.
445. (1989).
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precedent, yet the Court did not appear to actually conduct a proper
Katz inquiry.19  Moreover, essential to the Court’s holding was the fact
that the thermal imager was a device “not in general public use,”20 a
fact never before emphasized by the Court.  As a result, the case will
likely cause disorder in the lower courts as they attempt to determine
whether a particular surveillance technology has entered the domain
of “general public use.”
In addition, the Court’s opinion failed to address certain Fourth
Amendment implications that arose in the lower courts when these
courts were faced with the issue of thermal imaging.  In holding that
the use of a thermal imager was a “search,” the Supreme Court re-
versed the Ninth Circuit.21  Relying on decisions from other Circuit
Courts, in United States v. Kyllo22 (hereinafter “Kyllo III”), a panel of the
Ninth Circuit held that the government’s warrantless use of a thermal
imager was not an unreasonable search and thus did not violate the
Fourth Amendment.23  The court reasoned that  because the technol-
ogy merely measured “waste heat” and did not reveal any “intimate
details” inside Kyllo’s home, it was constitutionally legitimate.24  Ac-
cordingly, the court concluded that one’s home is not safeguarded
from such outside, non-intrusive government observation.25 While
briefly discussing the “waste heat” and “intimate details” doctrine, the
Supreme Court did not flatly reject them outright.26  As such, lower
courts are left without complete guidance and will be even more con-
fused in the future.
This comment examines and criticizes the Supreme Court’s rea-
soning in Kyllo.27  In doing so, it demonstrates that, under a Katz
framework, the use of the thermal imager in Kyllo violated the defen-
dant’s legitimate expectation of privacy and thus amounted to an un-
constitutional search, rendering the “waste heat” doctrine and
“intimate details” analysis inappropriate.28  In addition, this comment
will examine the future effect of the “not in general use” language
19. See infra Part IV.
20. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40.
21. See id. at 41.
22. 190 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 1999) (Kyllo III).
23. See Kyllo III, 190 F.3d at 1047.
24. See id.
25. See id.
26. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 36-37.
27. See infra Parts II-V.
28. See infra Part IV.
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used by the Court.29  Part II of this comment first summarizes the in-
door marijuana growing process and then explores the technology of
thermal imaging.30  Part III then presents the case law that generally
defines searches under the Fourth Amendment.31  The remainder of
Part III explores a variety of cases that specifically deal with thermal
imaging, and discusses the tests utilized and the outcomes reached by
these decisions.32  Part IV analyzes the Kyllo case in depth, focusing on
its facts, holding, and problems in its reasoning.33  Part V concludes
that the Court in Kyllo, although reaching the correct result, fell short
of fully protecting the citizen from unreasonable governmental
intrusions.34
II. MARIJUANA GROWING AND THE TECHNOLOGY OF THERMAL IMAGING
In the United States, more people consume marijuana than any
other illegal drug.35  Dried marijuana traditionally entered the United
States through smugglers,36 but, because of the effective suppression
of the smuggling trade by law enforcement, marijuana is ever increas-
ingly being produced in this country through indoor cultivation.37
This transition to indoor growing has additionally been encouraged by
its lucrative results; as many as four crops per year can be harvested
from nominal investment in seeds, water, and lighting.38
However, despite the cultivators’ attempt to avoid detection by
moving indoors, their need for great amounts of artificial lighting has
been their undoing.39  In order to provide sufficient lighting to grow
viable plants, four hundred-watt to one thousand-watt light bulbs are
necessary.40  These light bulbs are typically capable of operating at 150
degrees Fahrenheit, but their optimal temperature for cultivating ma-
29. See infra Part IV.
30. See infra notes 35-70.
31. See infra notes 71-96.
32. See infra notes 97-151.
33. See infra notes 152-254.
34. See infra Part V.
35. See National Household Survey on Drug Abuse, 200, at http://www.
samhsa.gov/oas/NHSDA/2kNHSDA/chapter2.html.
36. See The NNICC REPORT, supra note 10, at 66.
37. See id.; see also Wilson, supra note 13, at 892.
38. See Wilson, supra note 13, at 892.
39. See, e.g., Kyllo III, 190 F.3d at 1047.
40. See United States v. Pinson, 24 F.3d 1056, 1057; United States v. Penny-Feeney,
773 F. Supp 220 at 222 n.3 (D. Hawaii 1991), affirmed on other grounds sub nom, United
States v. Feeney, 984 F.2d 1053 (9th Cir. 1993).
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rijuana is sixty-eight to seventy-two degrees Fahrenheit.41  As a result,
their use generates tremendous amounts of heat, which is expelled
outside.42  Such thermal energy can then be detected and measured by
any thermal energy detection instrument.43  Up until Kyllo, law en-
forcement officials were using this technology to trace heat patterns
from private residences and thus infer that an individual may have
been growing marijuana plants inside.44
Thermal imaging, despite its relatively straightforward applica-
tion, is a highly advanced technology.45  It works in the following man-
ner.  All objects give off heat in the form of infrared radiation.46  This
radiation is detected by the thermal imager and then converted by it to
create images of the energy that can be observed and recorded.47  In
particular, these devices perceive the energy radiated from the outside
of surface objects and the internal heat that has been transmitted to
the outside of the surface object.48  Acting much like a camera,49 the
device does not send out beams or rays but rather merely records ther-
mal emissions.50  A viewfinder then translates these emissions and dis-
plays the results in patterns visible to the human eye.51  These results
typically shade the area around an object darker or lighter.52  The
shading is dependent on a baseline measurement that is set by the
operator.53
In addition, the device is passive, i.e., it does not project beams or
otherwise physically penetrate the targeted objects.54  Thermal imagers
do not “see through walls” or produce distinct images of people, ob-
jects, or activities within a building, unless, for instance, one has
41. See Pinson, 24 F.3d at 1057-58.
42. See Plaschke, supra note 12, at 608 n.5.
43. See Polatsek, supra note 9, at 453.
44. See United States v. Robinson, 62 F.3d 1325, 1328 n.2 (11th Cir. 1995).
45. See Mark J. Kwasowski, Note & Comment: Thermal Imaging Technology: Should Its
Warrantless Use by Police be Allowed in Residential Searches?, 3 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 393,
403 (1997).
46. See Kyllo III, 190 F.3d at 1044.
47. See id.; see also United States v. Field, 855 F. Supp. 1518, 1522 (W.D. Wis. 1994).
48. See Kyllo III, 190 F.3d at 1044.
49. See Kwasowski, supra note 45, at 403.
50. See Kyllo III, 190 F.3d at 1044.
51. See id.
52. See id.
53. See United States v. Field, 855 F. Supp. 1518, 1522.
54. See id.
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pressed his body up against a window.55  Rather, the device merely
reveals “that an enclosed structure contains a source of heat and the
relative quantity of heat being produced.”56
Thermal imaging was first used by the military.57  The technology
still is extensively used by the military to aid in such tasks as detecting
warm objects, like engines, in relatively cool environments58 and in
weapon targeting.59  Recently, the use of the thermal imager has ex-
panded to other areas.60  Thermal imaging presently has a number of
commercial applications.61  These include detecting overloaded power
lines, faulty building insulation, and excessive moisture in roofs.62  The
most significant use of thermal scanners, however, has been their ap-
plication by law enforcement personnel.63  While law enforcement
utilizes the device to aid in the tasks of search and rescue,64 to investi-
gate the causes of fires,65 to locate fugitives,66 to track covert, illegal
waste discharges,67 and for perimeter security,68 it is primarily used for
uncovering indoor marijuana growing facilities.69  It is this final and
principal use that raised substantial constitutional concerns.70
55. See State v. Siegal, 281 Mont. 250, 259.
56. Id.
57. See Kyllo III, 190 F.3d at 1044.
58. See Leonard E. Ravich, Thermal Imaging: A Review, LASER FOCUS, Feb. 1986, at
108.
59. See Janice Fioravante, Night Sight, INVESTOR’S BUS. DAILY, Feb. 26, 1995, at A6.;
see also United States v. Raytheon, 1997 WL 669646, at *3 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
60. See Fioravante, supra note 59, at A6.
61. See Kyllo III, 190 F.3d at 1044 n.4.
62. See id.
63. See id. at 1044.
64. See id. at 1044 n.4.  For an example of law enforcement using thermal imaging
to locate bodies in a natural disaster see, e.g., Teilo Colley, Fifth Body Found in Head-On
Train Crash Wreckage, PRESS ASS’N NEWSFILE, Oct. 15, 1994.
65. See, e.g., Fire Crews Seek Smoke Cause at World Trade Center, Reuters World Service,
Aug. 12, 1994.
66. See Kyllo III, 190 F.3d at 1044 n.4.
67. See id.
68. See id.
69. See Lynne M. Pochurek, From the Battlefront to the Homefront: Infrared Surveillance
and the War on Drugs Place Privacy Under Siege, 7 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 137, 149 (1995).
70. See Michael D. O’Mara, Comment, Thermal Surveillance and the Fourth Amend-
ment: Heating Up the War on Drugs, 100 DICK. L. REV. 415, 417 (1996).
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III. THERMAL IMAGING AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
A. Supreme Court Fourth Amendment Precedent
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution pro-
vides that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures
shall not be violated.”71  The Fourth Amendment’s limitations on
searches are invoked when the government invades an individual’s pri-
vacy.72  Under normal circumstances, law enforcement officials must
obtain a warrant before searching a home.73  In most cases involving
thermal imaging, however, law enforcement officials conducted the
scan before obtaining a warrant.74  Therefore, if a thermal imaging
scan was adjudged to be a “search” under the Fourth Amendment, it
presumptively violated constitutional privacy protections.75  In Katz v.
United States, the Supreme Court developed a two-part test to deter-
mine whether the government has in fact conducted a Fourth Amend-
ment “search.”76  As such, most courts that have addressed the issue of
thermal imaging have tried to fit it under the test developed in Katz.77
Under this test, in order to demonstrate that a police activity
amounts to a “search” under the Fourth Amendment, an individual
must establish the following: (1) that he exhibits an actual, subjective
expectation of privacy and (2) that this expectation is one that society
recognizes as reasonable.78  This assessment of the subjective and ob-
jective expectations of privacy in terms of reasonableness under the
Fourth Amendment has become known as the Katz inquiry, or the
“reasonable expectation of privacy” test.79
71. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
72. See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177-78 (1984).
73. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
74. See, e.g., Myers, 46 F.3d 668; Ishmael, 48 F.3d 850; Pinson, 24 F.3d 1056;
Cusumano, 67 F.3d 1497.
75. The Supreme Court of Montana has characterized the issue as the following:
“may law enforcement utilize warrantless thermal imaging of a structure to gather infor-
mation for probable cause for the later issuance of a search warrant, or does the use of
thermal imaging technology to gather information about the activities inside a struc-
ture itself constitute a search which can be accomplished only with judicial oversight
and following the issuance of a search warrant?” See Siegal, 281 Mont. at 257.
76. See id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
77. See, e.g., Myers, 46 F.3d 668; Ishmael, 48 F.3d 850; Pinson, 24 F.3d 1056;
Cusumano, 67 F.3d 1497.
78. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
79. See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986).
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After Katz, the Supreme Court has developed a long, and some-
what confusing, Fourth Amendment “search” jurisprudence.80  Lower
courts, when faced with the issue of thermal imaging, analogized to
these decisions to reach their conclusion regarding the constitutional-
ity of the device.81
One such Supreme Court development is the so-called “public ac-
cess therefore police access” doctrine.82  This doctrine states that, “if
an aspect of a person’s life is subject to scrutiny by society, then that
person has no legitimate expectation in denying equivalent access to
the public.”83
Further cases have refined this principle.  For example, in Air Pol-
lution Variance Board of Colorado v. Western Alfalfa Corp., the Court held
that an unreasonable search was not conducted when a state inspector
stood in an open field and observed smoke fumes flowing from a chim-
ney.84  In addition, in United States v. Place, the Court found that the
use of a drug-sniffing dog to smell unopened luggage at an airport was
not a search by virtue of the fact that the sniff revealed nothing more
than the odor and thus the presence of narcotics.85  Soon thereafter,
in United States v. Karo, the Court held that the warrantless detection of
a suspect’s electric beeper to locate him within a residence did not
violate the Fourth Amendment.86
Two years later, in California v. Ciraolo, the Court found that it was
constitutionally permissible for law enforcement officials to conduct
warrantless, visual observations from an airplane.87  The Court applied
Ciraolo in Florida v. Riley, and held that surveillance of a backyard from
a helicopter hovering 400 feet above ground was not a search.88  Jus-
tice O’Connor concurred in the judgment but wrote separately to ar-
gue that the “public access therefore police access” doctrine should be
80. For examples of the Court’s post-Katz history see STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG &
DANIEL J. CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 42-77 (6th ed. 2000).
81. See United States v. Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp.  220, 226-28 (D. Haw. 1991),
aff’d on other grounds sub nom, United States v. Feeney, 984 F.2d 1053, 1056 (9th Cir.
1993).
82. STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & DANIEL J. CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 48
(6th ed. 2000).
83. See id.
84. See 416 U.S. 861, 865 (1974).
85. See 462 U.S. 696, 699, 707 (1983).
86. See 468 U.S. 705, 714-15 (1984). Law enforcement followed the detection and
found narcotics-related substances inside. See id.
87. See 476 U.S. at 215.
88. See 488 U.S. 445, 449-52 (1989).
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determined by whether the public ordinarily had access to the infor-
mation, not whether it was legally possible for a member of the public
to acquire it.89  Later, in Dow Chemical v. United States, aerial photogra-
phy of an industrial complex with a mapping camera was held not to
be a search under the Fourth Amendment.90
Further, in United States v. Dunn, the Court held that it was reason-
able for the police to use a flashlight to aid in the visual inspection of
the inside of a barn.91  Finally, in California v. Greenwood, the Court
found that law enforcement was free to search one’s trash when it was
left on the curb for routine garbage pickup.92
These cases stand for the proposition that an objective reasonable
expectation of privacy is not afforded to things whose typical exposure
is out in the open and that are ordinarily detectable, even when the
particular observation might utilize techniques that are more acute
than normal human sensory capacities.93  Thus, lower courts drew a
line to distinguish those observations that are not too far beyond
human capabilities.94  With respect to thermal imaging, federal courts
relied on the above cases and attempted to draw such a line corre-
sponding to this rule.95  Specifically, as discussed below, courts devel-
oped the “waste heat” doctrine and the “intimate details” analysis to
address the problem.96
B. Judicial Treatment of Thermal Imaging
The first case to thoroughly examine the constitutionality of ther-
mal imaging devices was United States v. Penny-Feeney, a decision from
89. See id. at 452-56.
90. See 476 U.S. at 239.
91. See 480 U.S. 294, 305 (1987).
92. See 486 U.S. 35, 40-42 (1988).
93. See United States v. Solis, 536 F.2d 880, 881, 883 (9th Cir. 1976) (holding that
a dog sniff of the open air is constitutionally valid even though expert testimony
demonstrated that a dog’s sense of smell is eight times more sensitive than a human’s);
Katz, 389 U.S. at 352-53 (pointing out that words spoken into a telephone mouth piece
are ordinarily not emanated outside a phone booth); Karo, 468 U.S. at 715-18 (noting
that beeper signals are not ordinarily radiated from a house).
94. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 348-52 (noting that acoustic vibrations that were ascer-
tained using electronic surveillance equipment were not humanly perceptible); Dow
Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238 (noting that pictures taken with a map-
ping camera, even though not enlarged, were not too far beyond human capabilities).
95. See infra Part III-B.
96. See infra Part III-B.
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the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii.97  In this
case, a thermal imaging survey of the defendant’s property was con-
ducted from a helicopter.98  The survey revealed unusually high
amounts of heat emanating from the walls of the residence and from
areas of the garage.99  After a warrant was obtained, a raid uncovered
the presence of an extensive indoor, marijuana growing facility.100
The court began its analysis by asserting the “waste heat” doc-
trine.101  This doctrine states that one’s privacy cannot be violated
under the Fourth Amendment when the government merely measures
discarded heat emanating from one’s home.102  Utilizing the Katz in-
quiry, the court first found that the defendants did not demonstrate a
subjective expectation of privacy for waste because, by intentionally
venting the heat outside with exhaust fans, they deliberately exposed
the heat to public areas.103  Second, by analogizing to the dog sniff of
drugs in Place and the search of the garbage in Greenwood, the court
held that there was no objective expectation of privacy for waste
heat.104  In addition, the Penny-Feeney court noted that thermal imaging
was valid because it did not reveal any protected areas of privacy within
the home.105
Shortly after this decision, the Eighth Circuit addressed the issue
of thermal imaging under the Katz inquiry in United States v. Pinson.106
There, the Drug Enforcement Administration mounted a thermal
imager to a helicopter and, before obtaining a warrant, performed an
aerial scan of the defendant’s property.107  The court relied on the
decision in Penny-Feeney and utilized the “waste heat” doctrine.108  The
court thus found that the first prong of the Katz test was not satisfied
because the heat given off from the grow lamps was waste that the de-
fendant could not expect to remain private.109  Additionally, the court
97. See 773 F. Supp. 220, 228 (D. Haw. 1991), aff’d on other grounds sub nom, United
States v. Feeney, 984 F.2d 1053, 1056 (9th Cir. 1993).
98. See Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. at 223.
99. See id. at 223-24.
100. See id. at 224.
101. See id.
102. See id. at 226.
103. See Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. at 226.
104. See id.
105. See id. at 228.
106. See 24 F.3d 1056 (8th Cir. 1994).
107. See id. at 1057.
108. See id. at 1058.
109. See id.
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held that even if the defendant could establish any subjective expecta-
tion of privacy, the second prong of the Katz inquiry was not met.110
After reaffirming that the objective prong of the test asks whether the
individual’s privacy expectation is one that society would recognize as
reasonable,111 the court once again applied the “waste heat” approach
and drew a comparison between abandoned heat and garbage left on a
curb and odors emanating from luggage.112  The court also focused on
the technical capacity of thermal imagers, and noted that “[n]one of
the interests which form the basis for the need for protection of a resi-
dence, namely the intimacy, personal autonomy and privacy associated
with the home, are threatened by thermal imagery.”113  According to
the court, because the technology did not reveal any “intimate details”
of the home,114 the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights were not
violated.115
The Eleventh Circuit next addressed the issue in United States v.
Ford.116  There, a search was made pursuant to a warrant partly based
on results of a thermal scan conducted by police.117  The scan revealed
that the defendant’s home was emitting an “inordinate amount of
heat.”118  Law enforcement then obtained a search warrant, executed
it, and discovered a highly sophisticated hydroponic laboratory in-
side.119  The defendant then moved to suppress the evidence.120  The
court held that the defendant failed to meet the subjective prong of
Katz because he had taken intentional steps to vent the heat detected
110. See id. at 1059.
111. See id. at 1058.
112. See Pinson, 24 F.3d at 1058. Like the court in Penny-Feeney, the Pinson court
analogized to Place and Greenwood. See id.  The court first stated that just as one cannot
have a reasonable expectation of privacy for discarded items like bagged garbage, so
too should they not expect that heat voluntarily vented outside will remain private. See
id.  The court additionally found that “[j]ust as odor escapes a compartment or build-
ing and is detected by the sense-enhancing instrument of a canine sniff, so also does
heat escape a home and is detected by sense-enhancing infrared camera.” Id.  Thus,
the court held the use of the infrared surveillance technology to be constitutionally
permissible.  See id.
113. Id. at 1059.
114. See Pinson, 24 F.3d at 1059.
115. See id.
116. 34 F.3d 992 (11th Cir. 1994).
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by the imager.121  The court additionally found that the objective test
was not met.122  The court noted that this prong is to be analyzed by
referring to the fundamental values of the Fourth Amendment, and
stated that “[o]ne such value. . .is the intimacy of detail. . .that a sur-
veillance technique reveals in a particular case.”123  Citing Dow, the
court held that no violation of the Fourth Amendment can occur with-
out the disclosure of “intimate details,”124 and, since no such details
were observed here, no constitutional violation occurred.125
The next case to hold that a warrantless thermal scan was not a
“search” under the Fourth Amendment was the Seventh Circuit’s deci-
sion in United States v. Myers.126  The court relied on the “persuasive”
reasoning of the Eighth and Eleventh Circuits to reach its conclu-
sion.127  After the court said that the defendant failed to meet the first
prong of Katz,128 the court, citing Pinson, found that any subjective ex-
pectation of privacy that Myers might have is one that society is not
ready to accept as reasonable because no “intimate details” were de-
tected.129  The court also heavily emphasized the “waste heat” doc-
trine, stating that society is “not willing to protect as reasonable an
expectation of privacy in the wasted heat emitted from a home.”130
121. See id. at 995.
122. See id.
123. Ford, 34 F.3d at 996.
124. See id. (citing Dow Chem. Co., 476 U.S. 227 at 238).
125. See id. at 996-97 (quoting Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 452 (1989)).  In a
subsequent case, United States v. Robinson, the Eleventh Circuit once again held that the
use of thermal imaging was not an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment.
See 62 F.3d 1325 (11th Cir. 1995).  The court’s reasoning was nearly identical to its
reasoning in Ford. See id.  Not only did the defendant in Robinson fail to meet both
prongs of the Katz inquiry, but the court also noted that a thermal imaging device is not
unreasonable because it does not reveal “intimate details.” See id. at 1328-30.
126. 46 F.3d 668 (7th Cir. 1995).
127. See id. at 669.
128. See id.
129. See id. at 670.
130. Id.  In a recent case, the Seventh Circuit reaffirmed its stance on the permissi-
bility of thermal imaging. See United States v. Real Property Located at 15324 County
Highway E, 219 F.3d 602 (7th Cir. 2000).  The court utilized its holding in Myers in
reaching its conclusion. See id. at 603-04.  However, the opinion did note that if the
defendant could have produced evidence that suggested that the capability of the ther-
mal imager used here was superior to the one used in Myers, i.e., if it could “create a
precise video image of every living thing in the house, revealing facial features, body
positions, who is walking through a kitchen, and who is in the bedroom engaged in
sexual activity,” then perhaps the outcome would have been different. See id. at 604.
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Finally, in United States v. Ishmael, the Fifth Circuit added to the
majority position by upholding a warrantless thermal imaging scan of
the defendant’s property.131  The court concluded that “the crucial in-
quiry. . .is whether the technology reveals ‘intimate details.’”132  Here,
because the thermal imager did not reveal such intimate details within
the scanned structure, the Fourth Amendment was not violated.133
The only circuit that held that a warrantless thermal imager scan
violated the Fourth Amendment was the Tenth Circuit in United States
v. Cusumano.134  The court refused to apply the “waste heat” doc-
trine.135  The opinion noted that the imager itself does not detect
“waste heat,” but rather heat differentials, thus creating a heat signa-
ture.136  That is, the scan measures heat gradients across the exterior
surface of the scanned object.137  The device can detect “signatures” of
activities that generate a significant amount of heat inside one’s
home.138  To the court, “waste heat” was of no relevance.139
The court then stated that other circuits upholding the use of
thermal imagers had misframed the question.140  The Tenth Circuit
suggested that, rather than focusing on the tools that the government
employs to obtain the information, a court should concentrate on the
object of the government’s inquiry.141  Thus, to the court, the key
question is not whether the defendants have a reasonable expectation
of privacy into the waste heat emanated from their homes, but whether
they have an expectation of privacy in activities within their homes,
which could be revealed by their heat signatures.142
The court reasoned that the true value of the thermal imager was
what it revealed about the inside of the defendant’s home, not merely
131. See 48 F.3d 850 (5th Cir. 1995).
132. Id. at 855 (citing Dow Chem. Co., 476 U.S. at 238).
133. See id. at 856 (“The device assesses only heat differentials in objects and there-
fore poses no threat to the privacy concerns that the Fourth Amendment is intended to
protect.”).
134. 67 F.3d 1497 (10th Cir. 1995), vacated on other grounds, 83 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir.
1996)(en banc).
135. See id. at 1501.
136. See id. at 1501-02.
137. See id. at 1501.
138. See id.
139. See id.
140. See Cusumano, 67 F.3d at 1502.
141. See id. at 1502.
142. See id.
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that it could  measure the heat emitted from it.143  Thus, under the
first prong of Katz, the defendant demonstrated a subjective expecta-
tion of privacy for the heat signatures of domestic activity by conceal-
ing the grow operation inside his house.144  With regards to the second
prong, the court dismissed the government’s “intimate details” argu-
ment and concluded that the device intruded on the privacy of one’s
home, “not because it records white spots on a dark background, but
rather because the interpretation of that data allows the government to
monitor those domestic activities that generate a significant amount of
heat.”145  The court further added that the imager invaded the sanctity
of one’s home because it stripped the inhabitants of “the right to be
left alone from the arbitrary and discretionary monitoring of our ac-
tions by government officials.”146
Although the Tenth Circuit is the only federal court to have con-
cluded that the warrantless use of a thermal imager violated one’s pri-
vacy protections, the highest courts in several states have done so as
well.147  For example, in Montana v. Siegel, the Supreme Court of Mon-
tana, utilizing the reasoning of Cusumano, found that the defendants
met both prongs of the Katz inquiry.148  Likewise, in Commonwealth v.
Gindlesperger, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, also relying on the
Tenth Circuit’s reasoning, rejected a “waste heat” approach, and found
the practice repugnant to the Constitution.149  The Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court refused to extend the reasoning in Greeenwood and Place
143. See id.  The court concluded that the defendant manifested an expectation of
privacy because he located his activities within the sanctity of his home. See id.  The
interior of one’s home has traditionally been given the greatest Fourth Amendment
protection. See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 452-55 (1989) (O.Connor, J., concur-
ring), Karo, 468 U.S. at 714; Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980).
144. See Cusumano, 67 F.3d at 1502.
145. Id. at 1504.
146. Id. The court also recognized that this technology is stagnant, but will surely
improve with time. See id.  Therefore, the court thought it imperative to limit the use of
thermal imagers now, before they are able to reveal any more about the inside of one’s
home. See id. (noting that the reasonableness of privacy expectation should not “hinge
upon the outcome of a technological race of measure/counter-measure between the
average citizen and the government” because such a race is one the court felt the peo-
ple would undoubtedly lose).
147. See, e.g., Young, 867 P.2d 593 (Wash. 1994); Gindlesperger, 560 Pa. 202 (Pa.
1999); Siegal, 281 Mont. 250 (Mont. 1997).
148. See Siegal, 281 Mont. at 273-74.
149. See Gindlesperger, 560 Pa. at 232-33.
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to thermal imaging devices.150 As a result, the court found that both
prongs of Katz were met and consequently, that the Fourth Amend-
ment was violated.151
IV. THE KYLLO CASE
A. Facts and Procedural History
In July of 1991, Danny Kyllo’s next-door neighbor, Tova Shook,
became the focus of an Oregonian drug task force.152  At that time,
Kyllo was living in the center of a triplex in Florence, Oregon.153  Dur-
ing the investigation of Tova, William Elliot, an agent of the United
States Bureau of Land Management, an agency that was participating
in the task force, became suspicious of Kyllo.154
Elliot’s suspicions were aroused by additional information pro-
vided to him by Oregon state law enforcement.155  First, Elliot was in-
formed that Kyllo and Luanne, his wife, resided in one unit of the
triplex and Tova occupied another.156  Secondly, he was told that a car
parked at the triplex was jointly registered to Luanne and Kyllo and
that Luanne had been arrested one month earlier for delivery and pos-
session of a controlled substance.157  Lastly, Elliot was informed that
Kyllo had once stated to a police informant that Luanne and he could
supply the informant marijuana.158  Soon thereafter, Elliot subpoe-
naed the utility records of Kyllo and his neighbors.159  Elliot deter-
150. The court distinguished garbage left at the side of a curb from waste heat
emissions, because “waste heat, unlike garbage, can only be detected by means of a
technologically advanced device” Id. at 234.  Furthermore, because it is inevitable that
heat will dissipate from heat production, any heat-producing activity “does not require a
deliberate act nor is it preventable in the same way that one can conceal incriminating
garbage.” Id.  The court distinguished Place by noting that a “thermal imaging device,
unlike the trained drug dog, does not have the ability to distinguish between legal and
illegal activities occurring within the home based upon the amount of extraneous heat
detected.” Id..
151. See id. at 237.
152. See United States v. Kyllo, 37 F.3d 526, 528 (9th Cir.1994) (Kyllo I).  Tova was
the daughter of the task force’s original target. See id.
153. See United States v. Kyllo, 809 F. Supp. 787, 789 (1992).  Kyllo’s address was
878 Rhododendron Drive and Tova lived next door at 890 Rhododendron Drive. See id.
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mined that Kyllo’s electrical usage was abnormally high compared to
other residents in the area.160  From this, Elliot inferred that Kyllo
might be concealing an indoor marijuana growing facility within his
unit.161
Without securing a warrant, between 3:30 and 4:00 in the morn-
ing in mid-January of 1992, a thermal image survey of Kyllo’s triplex
was conducted.162  Sergeant Daniel Hass of the Oregon National
Guard performed this scan.163  From the passenger seat of a parked
car, Hass examined the triplex.164  Hass concluded that high heat was
being emanated from Kyllo’s roof above the garage and from one
wall.165  Moreover, Hass determined that Kyllo’s unit “showed much
warmer” than the other two units in the triplex.166  Due to Elliot’s be-
lief that high levels of heat emission are usually associated with the
intense lighting needed to grow marijuana, he thought these results
established further evidence of marijuana cultivation.167  Elliot then
presented this information in an affidavit to a magistrate judge, and a
warrant was issued.168  Elliot then searched Kyllo’s home and, as he
suspected, found an indoor growing operation.169  In addition, more
than one hundred marijuana plants were discovered, along with weap-
ons and drug paraphernalia.170
After an indictment and the district court’s denial of his motion to
suppress the evidence, Kyllo was convicted of drug manufacturing and
sentenced to 63 months in prison.171  Kyllo then appealed the denial
of his suppression motion, challenging, inter alia, the warrantless use of
the thermal imager as unconstitutional.172  A panel of the Ninth Cir-
160. See Kyllo III, 190 F.3d at 1043.  Kyllo’s maximum power use was 1.3 times the
usage of his neighbor. See Kyllo, 809 F. Supp. at 790.
161. See id.
162. See Kyllo I, 37 F.3d  at 531.






169. Kyllo III, 190 F.3d at 1044.
170. See id.
171. See id. at 1043.  Specifically, Kyllo was convicted on one count of manufactur-
ing marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. §841(a)(1).
172. See id.
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cuit remanded for an evidentiary hearing on the character and intru-
siveness of the thermal imager.173
On remand, the District Court made factual findings regarding
the device, and concluded that a thermal scan may be conducted with-
out first obtaining a warrant.174  It therefore denied Kyllo’s motion to
suppress.175  The judge also resentenced Kyllo to one month of impris-
onment, followed by a period of supervised release.176
Kyllo once again appealed, and a divided Court of Appeals re-
versed and remanded the case to the district court (hereinafter “Kyllo
II”).177  The Kyllo II court held that the warrantless thermal image scan
conducted by Sergeant Hass was an unreasonable “search” and, conse-
quently, the information acquired by the imager could not be consid-
ered in evaluating the validity of the warrant to search Kyllo’s
residence.178  The government petitioned the Ninth Circuit for a re-
hearing, and a panel of the court granted the petition.179  The stage
was set for the Ninth Circuit to once again decide whether Danny Lee
Kyllo’s Fourth Amendment rights were violated by Sergeant Hass’s war-
rantless use of the thermal imager.
Without oral argument, the panel withdrew the opinion in Kyllo II
and issued another opinion holding, by a two to one vote, that the use
of the thermal imager to detect heat emissions from Kyllo’s home “did
not constitute a search under contemporary Fourth Amendment stan-
dards.”180  Therefore, the Constitution did not prohibit the use of such
a device.181
The court began by noting that, to determine whether the govern-
ment has unconstitutionally invaded one’s privacy, the two-part Katz
inquiry is the appropriate test.182  Under the first prong, the court ap-
plied the “waste heat” doctrine and found that Kyllo did not manifest a
subjective expectation of privacy.183  The court rejected Kyllo’s conten-
tion that the thermal imager was not merely measuring “waste heat”
173. See Kyllo I, 37 F.3d at 531.
174. See Kyllo III, 190 F.3d at 1045.
175. See id.
176. See Kyllo I, 37 F.3d at 531.
177. See United States v. Kyllo, 140 F.3d 1249 (9th Cir. 1998) (Kyllo II).
178. See id.
179. See Kyllo III, 190 F.3d at 1047.
180. Id.
181. See id.
182. See id. at 1045.
183. See id. at 1046.
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emitted from the home, but rather was intruding into activities within
his home that he expected to remain private.184  Even though Kyllo’s
decision to move his growing operation indoors indicated some expec-
tation of privacy, the court placed heavy emphasis on the fact that he
never did anything to conceal the “waste heat” emissions created by
the heat lamps.185  According to the court, this inaction on Kyllo’s part
“demonstrat[ed] a lack of concern with the heat emitted and a lack of
subjective privacy expectation in the heat.”186  In sum, because the
thermal imager did not peer into Kyllo’s home but merely measured
“waste heat” emissions that Kyllo neglected to conceal, Kyllo did not
exhibit a subjective expectation of privacy.187
Second, the court held that even if Kyllo could illustrate a subjec-
tive expectation of privacy in the heat emissions, he could not establish
that such a privacy expectation would be found objectively reasonable
to society.188  The court first stated that even though one’s home is
afforded greater privacy expectations, activities within one’s home are
not afforded protection from “outside, non-intrusive” government sur-
veillance.189  The court then noted that the use of technology that am-
plifies government observation does not itself make non-intrusive
observation unconstitutional.190  Instead, to the court, the key inquiry
under the second prong of Katz is whether the technology reveals any
“intimate details” within one’s residence.191
After adopting the “intimate details” standard, the court found
that no such details were revealed in this case.192  In doing so, the
court placed heavy emphasis on the district court’s finding regarding
thermal imaging’s capabilities.193  Specifically, the court noted that the
technology is a “non-intrusive device which emits no rays or beams and
shows crude visual images of the heat being radiated from the outside of
the house” and that “the device cannot and did not show any people or
activity within the walls of the structure. . ., record[ing] only the heat
184. See id.
185. See Kyllo III, 190 F.3d at 1046.
186. Id.  The Ninth Circuit, relying on Place, analogized waste heat radiating from
the surface of a home to the odor of illicit drugs emitted from an object.
187. See id.
188. See id.
189. See id. at 1046-47. (citing Riley, 488 U.S. at 449; Ciraolo, 476 at 1047).
190. See Kyllo III, 190 F.3d at 1047.
191. See id. (citing Ishmael, 48 F.3d at 855 (quoting Dow Chem. Co., 476 U.S. at 238)).
192. See id. at 1047.
193. See id. at 1045-47.
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being emitted from the home.”194  As such, according to the court, the
thermal scan did not reveal any “intimate details,” but rather only
“amorphous ‘hot spots’ on the roof and exterior wall,” which are
neither “sensitive nor personal.”195  Accordingly, no constitutional
concerns were implicated.196
B. The Supreme Court’s Holding and Reasoning
Due to the varying results regarding thermal imaging in the lower
courts, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.197  In a 5-4 decision, Jus-
tice Scalia writing for the majority held that “the information obtained
by the thermal imager in this case was the product of a search.”198  As
such, the warrantless scan of Danny Lee Kyllo’s home was presump-
tively invalid.199
The Court began its opinion by noting that, in any Fourth Amend-
ment analysis, the home is given special protection.200  The Court then
reiterated that the appropriate test to determine whether a “search”
has occurred is the Katz test, specifically whether “the government vio-
lates a subjective expectation of privacy that society recognizes as rea-
sonable.”201  The Court emphasized that this test is used even when
one’s house is implicated.202
The Court then stated that “[t]he question we confront today is
what limits there are upon [the] power of technology to shrink the
realm of guaranteed privacy.”203  Thereafter, the Court noted that,
while the Katz inquiry may be difficult to refine in certain areas, no
such difficulty exists when a search involves the interior of a home.204
Purporting to apply the test, the Court stated that, in searches of the
interior of a home, “there is a ready criterion, with deep roots in com-
mon law, of the minimal expectation of privacy that exists, and that is
194. Id. at 1045 (emphasis in original).
195. See id. at 1047.
196. See Kyllo III, 190 F.3d at 1047.
197. See 530 U.S. 1305 (2000).
198. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 33.
199. See id. at 2046.
200. See id. at 2041-42.  Justice Scalia, quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S.
505, 511, (1961) wrote, “[a]t the very core” of the Fourth Amendment “stands the right
of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable govern-
mental intrusion.” See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34.
201. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 32.
202. See id.
203. Id. at 33.
204. See id.
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acknowledged to be reasonable.”205  According to the Court, to remove
this minimum expectation would allow law enforcement technology to
diminish the privacy guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment.206  Con-
cluding, the Court stated that any information about the interior of a
home obtained by sense-enhancing technology amounts to a search,
“at least where (as here) the technology in question is not in general
public use.”207
The Court then turned its discussion towards the “waste heat” doc-
trine and the “intimate details” standard.  As to the former, the Court
did not address the issue specifically as a “waste heat” inquiry.208  In-
stead, it addressed the question by rejecting the government’s argu-
ment that thermal imaging is not a “search” because it “detected ‘only
heat radiating from the external surface of the house.’”209  With refer-
ence to Katz, the Court “rejected such a mechanical interpretation of
the Fourth Amendment” because adopting such a standard would
leave the “homeowner at the mercy of advancing technology.”210  The
Court’s conclusion was forward looking, taking account of surveillance
technologies more advanced than a thermal imager in use or in
development.211
The Court then addressed and rejected the “intimate details” anal-
ysis.212  The Court stated that analogizing the Kyllo case to Dow, the
decision in which the Court first used the term “intimate details”, was
inappropriate because it involved aerial photography of an industrial
factory, a complex that “does not share the sanctity of the home.”213
To the Court, the protection afforded to one’s home has never been
dependent on the quality or quantity of the information secured from
a search.214  In fact, in one’s house, “all details are intimate, because
the entire area is held safe from prying government eyes.”215  There-
205. See id. (emphasis in original).
206. See id.
207. See id. (emphasis added).
208.  Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 35.
209. Id. (citing Brief for the United States 26).
210. Id. at 37.
211. See id.
212. See id. at 37.
213. Id.
214. See id.
215. Id. (emphasis in original).
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fore, the heat emissions detected by Officer Hass “were intimate details
because they were details of the home.”216
Justice Scalia continued by noting that limiting the use of a ther-
mal imager to those searches that did not obtain “intimate details”
would be wrong in both principle and practicality.217  As such, it would
fail to provide “a workable accommodation between the needs of law
enforcement and the interests protected by the Fourth Amend-
ment.”218  Scalia reasoned that, because there is no necessary nexus
between the complexity of a surveillance technology and the intimacy
of the details it detects, every use of a thermal imager, a “relatively
crude” device, will not be lawful.219  For example, a thermal imager
may detect when “the lady of the house” takes her sauna and bath, an
“intimate” activity, whereas a highly sophisticated device may detect
nothing more than whether one has left the closet light on.220  As
such, the Court would have to develop a jurisprudence that could de-
termine what activities were intimate.221  Further, law enforcement,
who would not know in advance whether its scan would detect some-
thing intimate, would not know whether its behavior was
constitutional.222
In summation, the Court stated that where law enforcement “uses
a device that is not in general public use to explore the details of the
home that would previously have been unknowable without physical
intrusion, the surveillance is a ‘search’ and is presumptively unreasona-
ble without a warrant.”223
C. The Issues Raised by Kyllo
The Supreme Court’s decision in Kyllo is problematic for two rea-
sons.  First, even though the Court agreed that the Katz framework was
the appropriate test to determine whether the use of the thermal
imager was a “search,” it did not fully apply the test.  In particular, the
Court failed to analyze each prong of the test with reference to the
specific facts of this case.  Instead, the Court found that, with any
216. See id.
217. See id.
218. See Id. at 38 (citing Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 181).
219. See id at 36.
220. Id. at 38.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 38-39.
223. Id. at 40.
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search of a home, a minimum expectation of privacy exists and this
expectation is one that society believes is reasonable.  Such reasoning
was inappropriate and unnecessary.  Under a routine Katz inquiry, the
Court could have concluded that Danny Lee Kyllo manifested a subjec-
tive and reasonable expectation of privacy in the heat producing activi-
ties within his home.  In doing so, the Court would have rendered the
“waste heat” doctrine and “intimate details” analysis irrelevant.
Second, the Court’s decision to limit its holding to only those
sense-enhancing technologies “not in general public use” was im-
proper.  Never before has Fourth Amendment jurisprudence de-
pended on whether the public ordinarily had access to the information
sought by the police.  Instead, to determine whether a “search” oc-
curred under the “public-access-therefore-police-access” doctrine, the
Court has asked whether it was legally possible for a member of the
public to obtain the sought out information.  This language likely will
cause confusion in the lower courts as they step away from the two-
prong Katz analysis and attempt to determine whether particular sur-
veillance technology has entered the realm of “general use.”
1. The Appropriate Katz Inquiry
a. The Subjective Prong
Even though the Court was correct in utilizing the Katz inquiry, its
analysis was incorrect.  The Court should have criticized the Ninth Cir-
cuit for incorrectly identifying the issue and displaying an utter misun-
derstanding of the law.  By focusing on the “waste heat” doctrine to
hold that Kyllo did not have a subjective expectation of privacy, the
Ninth Circuit erred, and the high Court should have more fully ad-
dressed this.
The Supreme Court has stated that it is “obvious” that “private
residences are places in which the individual normally expects privacy
free of governmental intrusion not authorized by a warrant, and that
expectation is plainly one that society is prepared to recognize as justi-
fiable.”224  The Ninth Circuit evaded this principle by characterizing
Kyllo’s relevant privacy expectation as a privacy expectation in the
“waste heat [emissions]. . . radiating from the outside surface of [his]
home.”225  The Ninth Circuit’s reliance on the “waste heat” doctrine
224. See Karo, 468 U.S. at 714.
225. See Kyllo III, 190 F.3d at 1046.
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was overly narrow and unduly restricted the Fourth Amendment’s pro-
tections against intrusions into privacy.
A thermal imager does not merely inform law enforcement offi-
cials that heat is radiating from a home.  It provides them with a basis
to infer that the occupants are engaging in heat-generating conduct
inside the home.  In fact, it is this inference that makes the technology
so useful to the government.  As a result, the issue should not be
whether the occupant has an expectation of privacy in the heat radiat-
ing from his home. Rather, it should be whether he has an expectation
of privacy in the information that can by revealed by thermal imaging,
i.e., whether he is engaging in heat-producing activities in particular
parts of his home.  Clearly, one has an expectation in keeping such
concealed, in-home activities private.  The Ninth Circuit, by relying so
heavily on the “waste heat” analysis, did not properly focus its inquiry.
When analyzing one’s expectation of privacy, the inquiry should focus
on the homeowner’s expectation regarding the interior of his home,
not on the heat emissions that might escape his home.
Moreover, by not clearly analyzing the first prong of the Katz test,
the Court displayed a profound misconception of Fourth Amendment
law.  It is well established that one exhibits a constitutionally cogniza-
ble, actual expectation of privacy whenever “he seeks to preserve [his
actions] as private.”226  Kyllo clearly behaved in such a manner.  He
chose to move his growing operation inside his residence.227  Further,
he did not decide to conduct his operation in an area visible through a
window by someone standing outside.228  Kyllo had sought to prevent
observation and to keep his operation private, and, but for the thermal
scan, the government would have lacked sufficient information to ob-
tain a search warrant.229  Therefore, Danny Lee Kyllo manifested an
actual expectation of privacy.  Any reasoning based solely on the fact
that the search involved one’s home, although relevant, should not be
dispositive.
In addition, according to the Supreme Court, one does not exhibit
an actual, subjective expectation in only two situations: (1) when one
either “knowingly exposes [something] to the public”230 or (2) when
one engages in acts that he knows will reveal information to an-
226. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979).
227. See Kyllo III, 190 F.3d at 1046.
228. See id.
229. See id.
230. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
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other.231  In this case, Kyllo did neither of these.  As to the first prong,
heat emissions are not detectable without the aid of sense-enhancing
technology like a thermal imager.  The ordinary human being, there-
fore, cannot sense or observe heat emanations.  Thus, such heat is not
“exposed” to anyone.232  As to the second factor, occupants of a home
generally will not be aware that their in-home conduct will produce
infrared radiation, that such radiation travels through walls, or that
others can detect this radiation with the aid of a technological device.
Even assuming Kyllo did know these factors, he took steps to conceal
his operation inside and keep it out of public view.  Therefore, Kyllo
did not knowingly expose nor willingly reveal what he was doing to
anyone outside his home.  Consequently, he had an actual expectation
of privacy, and any reference to “waste heat” was improper.233
b. The Objective Prong
The Court should further have held that the Ninth Circuit also
erred when it held that Kyllo’s expectation of privacy is one that society
would not recognize as reasonable.  Although the Court was correct in
affording special protection to the home, it failed by not disposing of
the “intimate details” analysis in its entirety when dealing with this
prong of the Katz inquiry.
In analyzing the second prong of the Katz inquiry, one extremely
relevant factor is whether the privacy expectation involves activities
within one’s home.234  In fact, the protection of privacy within one’s
residence was one of the principal purposes of the Fourth Amend-
ment.235  Furthermore, a home is “the center of the private lives of our
people” and should therefore be accorded “special protection.”236
Moreover, because the “assurance of personal security in one’s home”
is crucial to “our constitutional tradition,”237 any government action
231. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 743-44.
232. For a similar argument see Brief Amicus Curiae of the National Association of
Criminal Defense Lawyers and the American Civil Liberties Union, in support of Peti-
tioner at 10, Kyllo v. United States, 2000 U.S. LEXIS 4863 (No. 99-8508).
233. See id.
234. See, e.g., Karo, 468 U.S. at 714 (noting that the expectation that one’s home
will remain free of government surveillance is “plainly one that society is prepared to
recognize as justifiable.”).
235. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980).
236. See Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 99 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
237. See Carter, 525 U.S. at 100 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
\\server05\productn\N\NLR\46-1-2\NLR103.txt unknown Seq: 25 10-FEB-03 14:45
2002-2003] COMMENT 343
that intrudes on the privacy interests inside a home is presumably a
Fourth Amendment violation.238
By focusing on whether the imager reveals “intimate details”
within the home rather than whether the imager merely intrudes on
the sanctity of the home, the Ninth Circuit erroneously ignored these
established principles of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.  Justice
Scalia obviously recognized this when he ruled that the “intimate de-
tails” analysis was wrong in principle.  Yet, the Court seemed to contra-
dict itself by noting that, in one’s household, drawing a line between
details that are intimate and those that are not would be difficult be-
cause “[i]n the home,. . .all details are intimate.”239  This assertion im-
plies that intimacy is given special constitutional protection.  But this is
not the case.
The intimacy of the activity being surveyed may be considered
when determining whether society would be prepared to acknowledge
an expectation of privacy in the activity as reasonable.  However,
whether an activity is intimate is not dispositive.  Any inquiry into inti-
macy is just plain inappropriate in any Fourth Amendment analysis.
Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit adopted the “intimate details” ap-
proach by relying on Dow and Riley.240  However, neither of these cases
support the proposition that this standard is a constitutional require-
ment.  In Dow, to illustrate what expectations are reasonable in open
fields, the Court noted that “open fields do not provide the setting for
those intimate activities that the Fourth Amendment is intended to shel-
ter from government interference or surveillance.”241  The Court’s “in-
timate activities” language was meant to cover any activity within one’s
home in which a person would legitimately have an expectation of pri-
vacy.  Nowhere in the opinion of Dow is it suggested that the word “inti-
mate” was used to cover only those activities that are considered
sensitive or personal.
In Riley, the crucial fact was that the partial enclosure of a green-
house left it open to aerial view, which “any member of the public”
flying over could have also observed.242  The Court was not concerned
with matters of particularly private or sensitive significance, only those
that were openly visible to the public.  Even though the plurality in
238. See Karo, 468 U.S. at 715.
239. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 37 (emphasis in original).
240. See Kyllo III, 190 F.3d at 1047.
241. See Dow Chem. Co., 476 U.S. at 235 (emphasis added).
242. See Riley, 488 U.S. at 450-52.
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Riley used the term “intimate details,” the Court did not propose that
this standard is an indispensable factor in Fourth Amendment analysis.
In fact, a majority of the Court either did not address the search’s de-
tection of “intimate details” or expressly rejected the significance of
such an inquiry.243  The Ninth Circuit, however, through its misinter-
pretation of case law, unnecessarily raised this phrase to constitutional
significance.244  The Kyllo Court should have addressed this point
more forcefully so lower courts would be better equipped to handle
other Fourth Amendment cases and to prevent such improper stan-
dards from being adopted in the future.
The Court could have dealt with the second prong of the Katz test
in the following manner, and thereby made irrelevant any reference to
intimacy.  A thermal imager detects heat-producing objects and activi-
ties.  Thermal imagers may not disclose precise details about the char-
acter of in-home activities.245  Nevertheless, they can detect whether
there are extraordinarily high or low levels of heat-generating conduct
within the home.246  More precisely, these devices can indicate particu-
lar areas of a home where such heat-producing conduct occurs.247
In addition, most of the activities that are capable of being re-
vealed are innocent and are those that society would normally deem as
reasonable (e.g., the use of a sauna, the making of ceramics in a kiln,
or the household cultivation of plants or herbs in a domestic green-
house).248  Thermal imagers, therefore, enable law enforcement offi-
cials to observe “critical fact[s] about the interior of the premises that
the government is extremely interested in knowing.”249  As a result,
this technology violates a privacy expectation that society is prepared
to recognize as reasonable.  Any inquiry into the intimacy of what is
revealed is irrelevant when one is under surveillance.
Whether a search detects “waste heat” or reveals “intimate details”
should not be dispositive in any Fourth Amendment question.  If tests
such as these are developed in the future, the Katz inquiry may be un-
dermined and Fourth Amendment precedent may be turned on its
243. See id. at 463-64 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
244. For a similar argument see Brief Amicus Curiae of the Liberty Project in Sup-
port of Petitioner at 20-21, Kyllo v. United States 2000 U.S. LEXIS 4863 (No. 99-8508).
245. See, e.g., Siegal, 281 Mont. at 259.
246. See Kyllo III, 190 F.3d at 1044.
247. See id. (noting that the scan in this case discovered heat-producing activities
“from the roof of Kyllo’s home above the garage, and from one wall.”).
248. See Kyllo III, 190 F.3d at 1050 (Noonan, J., dissenting).
249. Karo, 468 U.S. at 715.
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head.  As a result, the government may seriously threaten the rights of
many people with an ever-increasing arsenal of technological weapons.
Such a prospect is too frightening to ignore.  Therefore, the Court, in
its role as a teacher to the lower federal courts, should have addressed
them and disposed of them more forcefully.
2. The “Not in General Public Use” Language
Prior to Kyllo, Supreme Court precedent held that, under the
Fourth Amendment, if law enforcement obtained information in a
manner that any member of the public could obtain it, then such po-
lice activity was not a “search.”250  Therefore, in Florida v. Riley, the
Court held that the police did not “search” the defendant’s property
when they flew 400 feet overhead to view an area of the property that
was partially obscured by a greenhouse.251  The Court reasoned that
because the public could legally hover over the defendant’s property
in a helicopter at a low level, so too could law enforcement.252  In dis-
sent, Justice O’Connor, uneasy with such a result, suggested that the
“public-access-therefore-police-access” doctrine should be modified to
ask whether the public ordinarily had access to the info sought by the
police, not whether it was legally possible for a member of the public
to obtain it.253  Her suggestion, however, has never persuaded a major-
ity of the Court.
Nonetheless, in Kyllo, the Court held that the warrantless use of a
thermal imager was a “search” based, in part, on the fact that the de-
vice was “not in general public use.”  This limitation, by forcing any
Katz inquiry to depend on reasonable foreseeability rather than expec-
tations of possibilities, may be an adoption of the O’Connor test.  The
Court did not admit to this.  But such a conclusion follows from the
holding in Kyllo.  Because the public ordinarily does not use thermal
imaging, then a police officer may not utilize the device to gather evi-
dence.  Put another way, no-public-access-therefore-no-police- access.
Under a civil libertarian framework, this new limitation is a vic-
tory.  By not allowing law enforcement to use surveillance technologies
that are not in general use, the Court has, in essence, delayed any ero-
sion of an individual’s guaranteed realm of privacy.  Now, any new ad-
250. See STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & DANIEL J. CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
48 (6th ed. 2000).
251. See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. at 449-52.
252. See id.
253. See id. at 452-56.
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vancements in technology will be off limits to law enforcement until, if
ever, they become widely available to the public.  This is cause for cele-
bration for privacy rights activists.
Not everyone, however, will be so happy.  The losers after Kyllo are
going to be the lower courts.  When faced with deciding whether the
use of newly advanced surveillance technologies constitutes a “search”
under the Constitution, courts will now have to focus their judicial at-
tention to whether the technology is “not in general public use” rather
than simply follow the case-by-case Katz framework.
Although Katz has been criticized as circular and thus subjec-
tive,254 it’s two-prong inquiry is straight-forward and allows for judicial
discretion.  The new limitation announced in Kyllo, however, is much
more unworkable.  It will be difficult for a court draw the line between
whether something is within the realm of “general public use.”  As dis-
cussed previously, at the time of Kyllo, thermal imagers were used in a
variety of commercial settings.  Yet the Court found the device not to
be in “general public use.”  How many commercial or private applica-
tions must a device have in order not to fall within this limitation?
The Katz test provides the courts with a more reliable guide than
any new test dependent on whether something is in “general public
use.”  The Supreme Court has a duty to provide lower courts with man-
ageable and predictable legal tests.  The “not in general public use”
limitation is far from one.  Therefore, havoc will likely run throughout
the lower courts when dealing with new advancements in surveillance
technologies.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s holding in Kyllo that the warrantless use of
thermal imaging of one’s home is not constitutionally permissible was
the correct result.  Under the Katz inquiry, the use of the technology
violated Kyllo’s legitimate expectation of privacy and amounted to an
unconstitutional search.  By focusing on terms such as “waste heat” and
“intimate details” the Ninth Circuit engaged in word play and ignored
well-established Fourth Amendment law.  The Court recognized this,
but should have done more to fully dispose of such irrelevant doctrines
so as to add more clarity and order to Fourth Amendment law.
The Court’s conclusion did remember to protect the special ex-
pectations of privacy in the home.  Thermal imagers reveal too much
254. See, e.g., W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 2.1(d) (3d ed. 1996).
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about one’s in-home activities and their prohibition was necessary in
order to maintain a society free of unnecessary, governmental intru-
sion.  But, by limiting its holding to only those surveillance technolo-
gies that are “not in general public use,” lower courts will be faced with
a very difficult task and the law thereby will be less predictable.
For these reasons, when the Supreme Court is faced with deciding
the constitutionality of surveillance technologies in the future, it
should utilize a legal framework that focuses not on the aspects of the
technology, but rather on what the technology will potentially reveal.
Moreover, the Court should abandon any inquiry into whether a par-
ticular law enforcement activity is one that is generally used by the pub-
lic.  Such a standard is unworkable and unnecessary.
The Court has a duty to put American citizens’ constitutional
rights before any interest in combating the War on Drugs.  In the fu-
ture, the Court must hold that the warrantless use of surveillance tech-
nologies to explore details of a home that previously would not have
been uncovered without physical intrusion constitutes an unreasona-
ble search under the Constitution, regardless of whether the technol-
ogy is or is not in general public use.  Otherwise, we may be one step
closer to living in an Orwellian nightmare.
Gregory Gomez*
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